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THE ECONOMICS OF PURE COMMUNISM**

Marx¹ divides the post-capitalist era into two stages. The first stage is 'socialism,' in which there is public ownership of the means of production and payment of wages according to the amount produced by the worker. The second stage is 'communism,' in which there is still public ownership, but workers receive goods according to 'need.' Now there are as many interpretations of the word 'need' as there are of 'communism.' One view of full communism is that of the utopian socialists. Bellamy, in Looking Backward,² thinks of full communism as meaning equal wages for everyone. The equality of wages is, in his view, the way to achieve the minimum needs of all individuals.

The Chinese view of communism, or at least the view presented by Chinese leaders in certain pronouncements within the most recent period, seems to say that 'need' should be decided by the state. Goods would be free, but rationed. There would also be a great deal of collective consumption--food, for example, would be prepared by the collective and eaten collectively. It is also implied that enormous abundance for individual consumers is not 'communist.'

The modern Soviet definition of communism³ is quite different from the Bellamy view or the Chinese view. It visualizes neither equal wages nor rationing, but rather a complete absence of money, prices and wages. Under pure communism, free goods⁴ would be produced under public control and ownership, and consumed by everyone according to his desires. This last interpretation is accepted for the purpose of this article.

The Problems and the Model

Assume an economy with public ownership, central planning, and central commands to producers, but no wages and no prices. In this model of pure communism, three major problems are alleged to be unsolvable.⁵ First, at zero price for all goods, demand would be infinite, since man's desires are infinite. Therefore, no supply could ever be enough to meet the demand. Second, at zero wages and with no penalty for indolence, labour, it is alleged, would lack sufficient incentive to work, since man is by nature lazy. Third, without rational prices there can be no optimal planning. Hence, communism would be very inefficient.

Assuming contemporary attitudes to work, it may be admitted that the

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first two objections are accurate enough to make full communism impossible. The utopian answer has always been that these attitudes will change, that man will be willing to work for the social good alone, and that desires may be voluntarily limited to some 'reasonable' finite amount. Obviously, if attitudes were to change in this way, the first two objections to full communism would vanish. But this is not a very interesting case.

It would be interesting on the other hand to know whether partial communism is compatible with traditional worker and consumer attitudes. By partial communism I mean an economic system where 80-90% of all goods are free. It is claimed below that this system is workable and that it would achieve almost all the political and social advantages usually alleged in favour of full communism.

The Problem of Abundance

Socialists have always assumed a great increase in production under socialism as a prerequisite to communism. They assume efficient planning, increased education and research, no unemployment, no wasteful advertising, no monopoly misallocation, no military spending, and so forth. These arguments need not be evaluated here because it is important to examine the objections to communism on their own grounds. Certainly, fantastic productivity increases make the supply problem easier, but they would still not meet infinite demand. To be realistic, we should assume only the rate of growth of labour productivity currently found in the Soviet Union.

In addition to the material achievement of very high labour productivity, Soviet theorists assume changes in subjective behaviour both with respect to a) willingness to work with no economic goal, and b) willingness to avoid pure wasteful or conspicuous consumption. Both of these changes in economic behaviour are explored below. Here, however, it should only be noted that the Soviet leaders talk as if these changes in human nature could be achieved by propaganda alone. That is not credible in terms of any social science, and certainly not Marxism, which always emphasizes the primacy of the economic base. It is quite another thing to say that once there is a very high level of abundance, a large sector of free goods, and the reduction of labour hours to 4 or 5 a day, it may be possible to change 'human nature.'

Assume extreme acquisitiveness on the commodity demand side and extreme indolence on the labour supply side. Are foreseeable advances in productivity sufficient to institute full communism? Suppose we begin with the Soviet economic model according to which public ownership is the only mode of ownership, most goods are sold for money, and wages are highly differentiated. Some percentage of Soviet goods (and services), such as health and education, is already free. The Soviet leaders claim that these free goods (and transfer payments in money) amount to more than 25% of the real wage, but the true percentage is quite debatable.

It must be emphasized that the economics of communism is the economics

of affluence. Thus, with its much larger material base, the United States could start with a much larger percentage of free goods ('skipping' socialism to that degree). Conversely, China cannot immediately have a large free goods sector except by drastic rationing of those goods, with high prices and high taxes on the remaining goods.

The argument here is that, whatever the present sector of free goods (and services) in the socialist countries, they could--if that is really desired by the political leadership--expand the free goods sector more rapidly than is usually admitted by most economists. Suppose a socialist economy in which there is public ownership of all enterprises. Suppose that initially 10% of all consumer goods are distributed free of charge. Suppose that its output of consumer goods doubles every 25 years. Suppose, finally, that this government (which could be the Soviet Union) decides to pursue a strict policy of no money wage increases, but uses the entire increase in productivity to increase the output, and so to reduce the prices, of selected consumer goods. Within a relatively short time, such an economy could have a very significant proportion of free consumption.

Suppose that in 1975 the aggregate consumption of goods (and services) in that economy is, say, 100 billion (thousand million) dollars, and that the income is 90 billion dollars. Assume in that year 10% free consumption, or 10 billion dollars of free consumer goods. On the assumption of double the output of consumer goods in 25 years, this means 200 billion dollars of consumer goods at constant prices in the year 2000. Assuming no wage increases (where this is the only source of income), there is still only 90 billion dollars' income in the year 2000. But this leaves 110 billion dollars of consumer goods unsold, all of which may be distributed free. Thus, with no inflation or higher taxation, the percentage of free consumer goods could rise to 55% in that year. On the same assumptions, the free consumption sector would be 78% by the year 2025. Yet the economic assumptions here (a 10% initial free goods sector, and twice as many consumer goods in 25 years) are very conservative for the Soviet Union.⁶ Only the political assumptions (real willingness to hold down money incomes and increase free goods) are radical.

To accomplish this economic transition gradually means to lower the prices of basic necessities slowly, while noting the reaction (the 'elasticity') of demand to price changes. It is even possible to specify which goods should first be made free without causing economic disruption. One of the criteria must be a fairly inelastic demand, so that falling prices do not greatly increase demand. Another criterion is that the free products should not be good substitutes for those still on sale, otherwise the increase in demand for the free goods might be much greater than predicted on the basis of their previous use.

Luckily, these two criteria only exclude luxury goods, and admit on the whole all consumer necessities. Moreover, producer goods need not be considered in this respect because their prices do not directly affect consumer or worker behaviour or the distribution of income. Prices of

producer goods would, therefore, seem to have little to do with the foundation of a full communist economy; they could remain as centrally-set accounting prices or established by market competition, whichever is the more convenient.

Economics and Psychology

The communist dream and the arguments supporting the change from a socialist to a communist economy seem to be satisfied sufficiently by the provision of a free supply of basic consumer necessities. Free consumer necessities may be sufficient because the point of the change is to increase socialist consciousness and the feeling for social cooperation and to remove the ethos of competition. If all the basic necessities are free, and one need no longer work in order to earn a living, eventually there would be a large change in the basic attitudes towards work and consumption, regardless of whether wages were still paid for luxury goods. An economy of 80% free goods would also mean (according to Soviet Marxists⁷) a very high degree of income equality, an equal distribution of economic (and political?) power, an end to political strife, freedom from economic constraint on sex, an end to most economically motivated crimes, an end to purely economic motivations for racism, and most other non-economic advantages claimed for full communism.

With the retention of prices for luxury goods, however, a communist economy may be established without asking workers and managers to act as if their psychological attitudes had progressed far beyond the actual 'human nature' imposed by the current economic base. To hope that revolutionary propaganda and education alone can permanently (beyond a temporary enthusiasm following a successful revolution) provide a sufficient basis for a change in human nature is not Marxist but utopian socialist. In other words, neither workers nor managers will change their competitive, egotistic economic behaviour until the material and institutional conditions are changed.⁸ A socialist economy, in which payment for consumer necessities is required, reinforces and produces competitiveness in people every day--it is not a left-over from capitalism.

At least one modern Marxist writer⁹ acknowledges that under socialism, with differential wages and prices for consumer goods, acquisitiveness must remain:

So long as the economy continues to be fundamentally a money economy, with the satisfaction of the bulk of people's needs depending on the number of currency tokens a person possesses, and so long as, under conditions of relative shortage, rationing governs distribution, the struggle of all against all to appropriate a bigger proportion of these currency tokens will inevitably persist.

Only when all consumer necessities have been free for some time under full communism would any social scientist--Marxist or otherwise--expect that

human behaviour might begin to change. (Obviously, this does not imply that material progress alone can provide a sufficient basis for a change in human nature. This would be a very crude and inaccurate economic determinism.)

Wiles¹⁰ maintains that it is impossible to have full communism without prices and without rationing. He maintains that one or the other is necessary. His argument may be correct with regard to the immediate introduction of 100% free goods. Yet, the point really is that--while keeping supply and demand in equilibrium--one could gradually eliminate prices and rationing for, say, 80% of goods in the foreseeable future. Demand would be limited by keeping aggregate wages constant, while labour would be allocated by the same differential wages as before.

The Soviet leaders like to discuss the psychological conditioning that inclines people to make lesser, more 'reasonable demands.' We have already pointed out that consumer attitudes cannot be expected to change as a result of propaganda, but may change eventually as a result of changed conditions. If 80% of consumer goods are free, there may be some decrease in the desire to keep up with the Joneses and, generally, less conspicuous consumption. After all, conspicuous consumption is designed to impress others, and you cannot do that by consuming free goods. Moreover, once it is discovered that demands are filled, even the ordinary desire to save for a rainy day should disappear. Furthermore, purely wasteful use by delinquents should also disappear as a new generation takes such free goods for granted--especially if we begin with basic necessities. Even the anti-communist Wiles¹¹ admits that, given present attitudes towards work and consumption, the 'rational' consumer of Western economics a) has physical limits on the food, clothing and shelter he can use, and b) wants leisure from consuming!

It may be suggested that very low prices should be kept on basic necessities to prevent mischievous waste by children or teenagers. Low prices, however, may mean more administrative cost than revenue. For example, in the case of buses, removing fares altogether would lessen the work of bus drivers. Yet how many people will ride in buses just for fun--if the reduction is gradual? After a product is free for some years, it is more likely to be taken for granted. In any case this is not a crucial point.

Of course, another way to reduce demand is rationing, and some Chinese Maoist theory (as well as practice) has moved in this direction. No other Marxists have ever considered this a possibility under communism. Moreover historical experience shows that rationing is a last resort. It is unpleasant and inefficient and a very poor means of allocation in any normal situation.

If 80% of consumer goods are free, however, the other 20% might be distributed mainly by monetary means, but with physical rationing or a combination of physical and monetary rationing in some small sectors. For example, even at a fairly high level of affluence, some expensive items like

trips to other stars might be rationed. At a lower level of affluence, one might allow everyone a certain amount of shelter, a certain type or quality of housing, a certain type or quality of clothing. Larger amounts would require some kind of monetary payment.

The Saving Ratio

The upshot of the above discussion is that a wide area of purely communist distribution could be achieved in a practical way in the near future without an extraordinary rate of growth. In fact, there is no reason to expect a communist society to pursue growth in a feverish manner. For one thing, the rate of saving must inevitably be democratically decided in a communist society. The question must be decided by everyone, not by a few giant corporations or an elite bureaucracy, because dissatisfaction would easily reveal itself in the decision of individuals to do less work or no work--since basic sustenance is guaranteed.

Moreover, in Galbraith's 'affluent society,' which full communism must require as its minimum possible level, further advances become less urgent. One winter coat may be vital, two, less so. At a high level of consumption, and automation (assuming world peace), there may only be temporary and specialized reasons for further growth--at least in the view of the vast majority of economic units who will make the decision. Furthermore, we can assume that cultural advance and family planning will tend to produce a stable population. Moreover, as artistic sensitivity increases, and as the current commercialization of culture is finally eliminated by institutional change, we may expect a stronger desire for leisure time than for material goods.

Little growth and little net investment--shades of the classical economist's 'stationary state'! But there is a difference. We are not envisaging an end to technical progress. On the contrary, another reason for assuming a tapering off of net investment is just this tendency towards wide-scale innovations of a capital-saving nature.

The Incentive Problem

The classical attack on full communism is that, if all goods are free, there is insufficient incentive to work. Suppose, however, that there is a gradual change, with only a half per cent of consumer goods per year passing from the monetary to the free goods sector. It seems unlikely that at some point the ordinary worker would suddenly stop working. It may still be argued that he will gradually reduce his effort. Given continued social encouragement for the ownership of luxury goods, however, the argument about 'infinite desires' suggests a continued incentive to work in spite of the growing free goods sector. Even at an 80% free goods level, differentiated wages (which could be used to buy remaining luxury goods) should be a more than sufficient incentive.

Soviet Marxists emphasize that the attainment of full communism implies

that certain difficult preconditions have been met: 1) a very high level of production per man hour, so that each worker needs to work only a few hours a day; 2) an attitude towards work such that each worker will positively enjoy working those few hours; and 3) some degree of elimination of differences in outlook towards and in the nature of urban and farm jobs as well as manual and intellectual jobs, so that there will be a sufficient number of volunteers for farm and manual labour. If automation continues at a rapid pace, and the first goal is only a gradual approach to 80% communism, then these utopian-sounding prerequisites can be sufficiently met within the foreseeable future. Hours of labour have declined astoundingly in the last hundred years. Moreover, if past trends continued, even in the USA, then the usual number of working years could fall within a few decades from the present 40-50 years to as little as 15-20 years.¹²

The trend towards automation makes it likely that an ever larger part of the population will devote itself to advanced scientific and creative work. In that case, we can assume that there would be much greater willingness to work for the good of society. Once assured a basic minimum wage, most scientists today would probably work more for the joy of what they are doing than for any amount of income. The same would certainly be true of artists, even today. Thus, although everyone may be guaranteed a minimum standard of living, most people would probably continue to do quite a bit of productive labour. This would be especially true if there were a vast amount of leisure time. Even today, there is certainly some question about how much leisure time one really wants, what one can do with it, and how much time one can simply fritter away. It seems much more likely that one would want to begin to do something constructive even if there were no constraint to do so.

Certainly, then, given only 80% communism, with differentiated wages and prices on luxury goods, rewards would be offered to workers, managers, or scientists who invented or applied new industrial processes. Furthermore, since we are greatly increasing the amount of leisure time, one would assume that this factor plus the increase in scientific education should assure a great deal more research than ever before. Moreover, the barriers to the use of innovations that have arisen from rigid central direction in the Soviet economy, that is, the unwillingness of managers to take risks which might result in a short-run decline of their bonuses, should be reduced when managers have much less to fear from demotion or bonus reduction.

There is, nevertheless, the problem of incentives for the reluctant worker. Suppose that there is some significant percentage of workers with such inclinations that they are simply unwilling to do any work whatsoever, when they are provided with all the basic necessities of life free of charge. Should there be a reward and punishment system for such workers? If someone simply says: "I will not go to work for the society," then certainly some social and economic pressure could be brought to bear. In the first place one would assume that in such a society there would be a great deal of social pressure by friends, neighbours and relatives to do some amount of work. After all, we are only talking here about three or four

hours a day!

It is easy to conceive of other punishments and rewards. In purely economic terms, the individual refusing to do any work will not receive wages. Therefore, he will not be able to buy any of the remaining 20% of consumer goods (mainly luxury goods). Presumably, that will be a goal for the average worker, even assuming present-day attitudes to work and consumption. More extreme economic or even criminal penalties--such as those that Soviet authorities sometimes imply--violate the basic goals of a communist society. Nor are these penalties of great use to society. The fact is that those workers who would be so unwilling to give the minimum amount of labour (such as two hours a day) would probably be of such poor quality that society would miss very little by not having their work.

Optimal Planning without Prices

Assume that a very wide range of consumer goods, say 80%, are free; they have no prices (or their price is zero). Assume also that there is public ownership, and that wages are still paid according to the amount of work done. The wages can only be used to buy the remaining 20% of consumer goods (mostly luxury goods). If 80% of consumer goods have no prices, can there be any optimal planning?

Suppose in the first case that there is central planning. For the remaining consumer goods with prices as well as for producer goods, the situation has not changed from the situation obtaining under planned socialism. For producer goods, with no market the planners must simply gather information on the three things needed for the usual optimal programming: first, marginal preferences for the outputs; second, all the alternative technologies (as sets of input-output coefficients); and third, the available resources. With these data, optimal programming can find the output combinations and technologies producing the maximum output. They can also then solve the dual programming problem to find shadow prices. The shadow prices are prices set in accordance with the planned optimal outputs; they are used in this model solely within the planning organs for accounting and planning purposes only; and there are still no prices and no money used in the exchange process.

For priced consumer goods (luxury goods) there is still a market with consumer choice. Since, however, the supply is set by a government monopoly, the prices in the market only make short-run supply and demand equal. They are not long-run rational prices, that is, they do not directly tell us the degree of long-run scarcity of resources or the consumer preferences at equilibrium prices. The planners could get an indication of preferences if they know that the current prices are above or below long-run equilibrium prices. In any event, they could use resources where the rate of profit is highest. Such planning, however, is still very complex, and the current prices give only the smallest part of the data. Calculating the long-run equilibrium prices or costs is a very difficult problem in this case, for which a great mass of information is needed. Hence, under planned

socialism (even with a consumer goods market), it may be easier to collect the direct information about demands, technologies and resources, so that planners can calculate maximum outputs or minimum costs.

In the free goods sector, it is still perfectly possible to collect the necessary information and to make the necessary calculations for minimizing costs by choosing proper technologies. In fact, to minimize costs the planners need only three types of information. First is fixed output targets, which are set in this model at those amounts necessary to meet the demand at zero price. The planners need only allow for slight changes in population and tastes each year. Second, there are the possibilities of technology, which are given by engineers as usual. Third, there are the costs of the resources. These are given roughly by the continued differentiated wages of current labour and by the shadow prices of producer goods (already calculated).

Market (Decentralized) Communism and Optimal Choice

Is not 'market communism' a contradiction in terms? Certainly, full communism implies no wages and no prices, no competitive markets for any type of commodity or for labour. Even 80% communism implies that there is a zero price and no market for 80% of all consumer goods. It must be emphasized, however, that 'decentralized communism'--with the continued use of a market for luxury goods and all producer goods--is no contradiction.

The combination of decentralization and 80% communism should be highly attractive to Marxist socialists.¹³ On the one side, decentralized decision-making concerning output combinations and the technologies means continued efficiency and incentives to optimize (with bonuses based on profit maximization). On the other side, the continued existence of wages and prices for some luxury goods does not prevent the advantages seen in the communist dream. Surely, if 80% of all consumer goods are free, a very non-commercially oriented political, social, and psychological behaviour would emerge.

If such a combination is possible, the present objection to market socialism in East Europe disappears. The opponents of market socialism admit that it may lead to greater efficiency, but they claim that the greater (or more rational) use of material incentives will postpone communism forever. If it is possible to keep decentralization and some material incentives while increasing the area of free goods, the objection may be overcome. In other words, the remaining wages and prices would simply become less and less important as supply became gradually free. Under these conditions wages and material incentives might not need to be legislated out of existence, but might simply 'wither away' (so that money and the market are first limited to the luxury sector, and are then allowed to die a very slow, natural death). This seems not only preferable, but the only practical way, since we must otherwise believe that acquisitive psychology disappears before a long period of abundant free goods begins.

The question is, however, how can a manager make decentralized optimal decisions if there is no market price on his output? Suppose that managers are given the rule to maximize profit, and are told to set outputs and technologies on that basis. Suppose also that the manager receives a bonus according to the enterprise rate of profit, and gives bonuses to the workers on that basis or other appropriate criteria. The wages and bonuses are used to buy luxury goods (say, 20% of all goods). Furthermore, producer goods continue to be sold for money. Thus, in the sectors of luxury goods and producer goods, prices can continue to be set by competition in the market--as under market socialism.

This still leaves difficult questions for the sector in which consumer goods are given away free. How do firms plan rationally in that sector? Where do firms get the money to pay for labour and for producer goods in that sector? The best answer is that the central government pays the firm a price per unit, and gives away the goods through local outlets. This system allows the consumer goods firm to have the money to pay for the labour and the producer goods they need in the market. Before proceeding to the theory of such government price setting, we may note its present application to the armaments industry. In the huge armaments sector the US government, like the Yugoslav or Soviet governments, pay firms a price determined outside the market mechanism and disposes of the product outside the market mechanism.

What price should the government pay to the firms? Clearly, to avoid subsidies, the price must at least cover the wages and producer goods costs paid out by the firm. In the aggregate this also means that the revenue of the firms in the free goods sector (determined by government) helps to set a limit to wages. The government will still require some further wage controls to ensure that the aggregate wages are just sufficient to buy the (priced) luxury goods so that no inflation is permitted in that sector.

In order to encourage the firm (in the free goods sector) to optimize in the appropriate fashion, the government price paid should be the sum of 'cost' plus a 'normal profit.' Since the labour and producer goods are priced in the market, the government can simply use actual costs at going prices. The 'normal profit' should be fixed so that it is equal to the social rate of interest. The social rate of interest is that rate at which the government loans capital, so that the government supply of capital and firms' demand for capital are equal. Since the firm then has a 'price' for its goods, it can maximize profit in the usual way.

Full Communism

Finally, the assumptions of the model may be loosened somewhat. Suppose that all consumer goods are given away free by the central government and that no wages are paid. Suppose that the problems of limiting demand to a 'reasonable' amount and obtaining incentive for some minimum hours of labour are solved by (gradual) changes in attitudes to work. Then, for purposes of optimization, the system could operate with not too many

changes.

Producer goods would still be bought and sold in a market. Managers would still be instructed to maximize profits (and they follow instructions since incentive problems are assumed away). In consumer goods all firms would receive a price from the central government for delivery of goods to specification. The price paid by the central government would include the actual market cost of all producer goods. It would no longer include actual wages because no wages would be paid. But it would still include a shadow price for capital (the average rate of profit), and would now also include a shadow price for each kind of labour (a 'wage' equal to the marginal product of labour derived from an optimal plan). In turn, all firms would pay the government for labour--as a socially provided good--at those same wage levels.

Conclusion

The economic arguments against communism were examined and found wanting. An economy of 70% or 80% free consumer goods seems possible--with little or no loss in performance--in an easily foreseeable future. A gradual increase of the free goods sector, with careful attention to elasticities of demand, should make it possible to maintain equilibrium of supply and demand for all products, assuming present rates of productivity increase in the USA or USSR. Second, a gradual increase of free goods combined with continued wages to pay for the remaining priced (luxury) goods should present few new incentive problems. Third, with the use of accounting prices for free goods (derived from optimal programming processes), optimal planning can continue to function as well as under socialism. Moreover, the planning can be centralized or decentralized as preferred, assuming the accounting prices are given to the managers as parameters. Finally, if economic performance is at least as good as in socialism, most of the arguments in favour of communism are non-economic--but these are beyond the scope of this article.

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Footnotes

¹Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," Selected Works of Marx and Engels (New York, 1968 - "Critique" written 1875), pp. 315-35; also Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring (New York, 1939 - first published 1878), Part III.

²Edward Bellamy, Looking Backward (New York, 1960 - first published 1887).

³See, for example, the Soviet literature in A. Zvorykin, "Approaches to Work Under Communism," Soviet Sociology, Vol. I (Fall 1962), pp. 29-37;

CPSU, The Road to Communism, Documents of the 2nd Congress (M, 1967); and Editorial, "The Great Program of Communist Construction," Problems of Economics, Vol. I (April, 1959), pp. 3-10. See also the Western critiques in I. Fetscher, "Marx, Engels, and the Future of Society," Survey, Vol. 38 (October 1961), pp. 100-10; J. Balinsky, "Has the Soviet Union Taken Steps Toward Communism?", Social Research, Vol. 28 (Spring, 1961), pp. 1-14; N. Jasny, "Plan and Superplan," Survey, Vol. 38 (October, 1961), pp. 29-43; L. Labedz, "The New CPSU Program," Survey, Vol. 38 (October, 1964), pp. 12-28; H.G. Shaffer, The Soviet Economy (New York, 1965), Part IV; R. Schlesinger, "The CPSU Programme: The Conception of Communism," Soviet Studies, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (April, 1962), pp. 383-406; H. Marcuse, "The Transition from Socialism to Communism," in Soviet Marxism (New York, 1958).

⁴The word "goods" includes goods and services throughout this article.

⁵The most comprehensive and serious Western critique of pure communism is by Peter Wiles, The Political Economy of Communism (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), especially chs. 17, 18, 19, and 20.

⁶See the far more optimistic calculations of Soviet potential for free goods distribution in the careful article by Lynn Turgeon, "Future Levels of Living in the U.S.S.R." Economics of Planning, Vol. 3 (September, 1963), pp. 149-65, especially p. 150.

⁷See some examples of the vast Soviet literature on the non-economic aspects of communism in E.G. Balagushkin, "The Building of Communism and the Evolution of Family and Marital Relations," Soviet Sociology, Vol. I (Winter, 1963), pp. 42-47; M.N. Rutkevich, "Elimination of Class Differences and the Place of Non-Manual Labour in the Social Structure of Soviet Society," Ibid., Vol. 3 (Fall, 1964), pp. 3-12; G.M. Shtraks, "The Problem of Conflict in Socialist Society," Ibid., Vol. I (Spring, 1963), pp. 3-9. See also examples of the non-Soviet literature in G. Brinkley, "Foreign Policy and the Transition to Communism," Survey, Vol. 38 (October, 1961), pp. 117-25; S.V. Utechin, "Educating the New Man," Ibid., Vol. 38 (October, 1961), pp. 63-71.

⁸See further discussion and references in H. Sherman, "Material Incentives in Socialism," Monthly Review, Vol. 19 (January, 1968), pp. 61-63.

⁹Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory (New York, 1968), p. 654.

¹⁰Wiles, op. cit., p. 348. ¹¹Ibid., p. 349.

¹²See the very interesting discussion of this point in Martin Bronfenbrenner, "The Scarcity Hypothesis in Modern Economics," The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 21 (July, 1962), pp. 265-70.

¹³For the overall views of Marx and Engels on decentralization under communism, see footnote 1 above. See also the large number of other relevant quotations from Marx and Engels in Wiles, op. cit., pp. 357-60.